Neural mirroring systems: Exploring the EEG mu rhythm in human infancy  by Marshall, Peter J. & Meltzoff, Andrew N.
RN
h
P
a
b
a
A
R
R
2
A
K
M
E
M
P
C
1
dDevelopmental Cognitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience
journa l homepage: ht tp : / /www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /dcn
eview
eural mirroring systems: Exploring the EEG mu rhythm in
uman infancy
eter J. Marshall a,∗, Andrew N. Meltzoffb
Department of Psychology, Temple University, 1701 North 13th St, Philadelphia, PA 19087, United States
Institute for Learning & Brain Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, United States
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:
eceived 5 July 2010
eceived in revised form
0 September 2010
a b s t r a c t
How do human children come to understand the actions of other people? What neural
systems are associated with the processing of others’ actions and how do these systems
develop, starting in infancy? These questions span cognitive psychology and developmen-
tal cognitive neuroscience, and addressing them has important implications for the studyccepted 20 September 2010
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EG
of social cognition. A large amount of research has used behavioral measures to investi-
gate infants’ imitation of the actions of other people; a related but smaller literature has
begun to use neurobiological measures to study infants’ action representation. Here we
focus on experiments employing electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques for assessingirror neuron system
erception–action
mu rhythm desynchronization in infancy, and analyze how this work illuminates the links
between action perception and production prior to the onset of language.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Behavioral studies document that the observation and
execution of human acts are closely linked in human
infancy. For example, infants imitate actions they observe
others perform. The existence of successful imitation indi-
cates that infants can use the acts they perceive to generate
their ownmatchingacts: perceptiondrivesproduction. The
human infant is a more proliﬁc and skilled imitator than
the young of any other species. Although passerine birds
learn to sing like their conspeciﬁcs and certain nonhuman
primates imitate particular acts (chieﬂy to obtain food),
human infants aremotivated to imitate awide range of acts
evenwithout explicit rewards for doing so. Infant imitation
serves a social-emotional function of communication and
bonding. It also serves a cognitive function, as amechanism
for acquiring motor skills, causal information, and tool-use
techniques.Humanchildrendonot relyexclusivelyon their
own individual discoveries or on reward/punishment con-
tingencies. Before language emerges, imitation is one of
the chief mechanisms for early learning in Homo sapiens
(Meltzoff et al., 2009).
A crucial question concerns the neural processes
involved in such everyday human behavior, a topic of
increasing interest as the gap is bridged between neu-
roscience and the study of human social interaction
(Blakemore et al., 2004; Frith and Frith, 2010). The intricacy
of the behavioral ﬁndings suggests that formulating a com-
prehensive developmental neuroscience of social learning
and imitation will ultimately involve examining interac-
tions amongmultiple brain systems. However, one starting
point concerns basic mechanisms by which neural acti-
vation during action observation may overlap with the
patterns of activation during action execution. Although
this highlights just one aspect of the neural processes likely
involved in human imitation, it focuses on the fundamental
link between perception and production, which is pivotal
to successful imitation and which is at the center of our
inquiry here.
Interest among neuroscientists in perception–action
coordination and imitation has long historical roots, but
its visibility was boosted by the discovery of “mirror neu-
rons,” using single-cell recording techniques, in the ventral
premotor cortex (F5) of macaque monkeys (di Pellegrino
et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996).
These neurons respond not only when a monkey carries
out a particular goal-directed action on an object (e.g.,
grasping a peanut), but also when the monkey observes
the same action being carried out by another individual.
It is not well established that individual mirror neurons
exist in the human brain, because single-cell recording is
not possible in typically functioning people (although for a
study of adult epileptic patients see Mukamel et al., 2010).
Nonetheless, there is a great deal of evidence for overlaps
in activation of certain brain systems during action exe-
cution and action observation in humans (e.g., Decety and
Grèzes, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2010; Hari and Kujala, 2009;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
In adults, evidence for shared neural circuits for action
observation and execution has derived from a variety
of neuroimaging techniques including functional mag-nitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123 111
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), magnetoencephalography
(MEG), and electroencephalography (EEG), as well as the
transient disruption of cortical networks through the use
of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). The fact that
there is shared circuitry – at some level of description –
is not contentious. However, there is a vigorous debate
about the inferences that can be drawn from the existence
of such circuitry. Some investigators argue that a human
“mirror neuron system” (MNS) plays an essential role in
the understanding of others’ actions and adults’ inferences
about others’ mental states (Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010). In contrast, others suggest that many
of the broad inferences that have been drawn from MNS
research are poorly characterized and depend on specu-
lations that reach too far beyond the empirical ﬁndings
(Dinstein et al., 2008; Hickok, 2009; Turella et al., 2009).
This essay is not primarily aimed at the debate over a
putative human MNS, and indeed, as will become evident,
the analysis we provide is largely orthogonal to the debate
as it is currently framed. Instead, our focus lies squarely on
developmental issues. In an attempt to get important new
developmental issues on the table – and to avoid being
drowned out by the existing controversy over the nature
and correct characterization of an adult MNS – we use the
rhetorical strategy of largely avoiding the phrases “mirror
neurons” or “MNS” with respect to humans. Instead, we
prefer the phrase “neural mirroring systems” and seek to
use it in a theoretically neutral way that is not wedded to
single-cell mirror neurons of the type reported in the mon-
key work. Echoing the approach of Hari and Kujala (2009),
we use this phrase as a theoretical pointer to the fact that
some (as yet unspeciﬁed) neural circuitry obviously sup-
ports human behaviors involving observation–execution
coordination. A pressing question is how to best charac-
terize this neural machinery in terms of its origins and
development.
A developmental focus on the neural processes connect-
ing action observation and execution has received less
empirical attention than it deserves. The fact that human
infants imitate establishes that action observation and
execution are already closely bound in the human pre-
verbal period. Cognitive models of infant imitation have
proposed the idea that infants have a “supramodal rep-
resentation of human acts” that unites into one common
framework their own acts and those they see others per-
form (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997). However, despite a great
deal of behavioral work on infant imitation and related
constructs in social–cognitive development, until recently
there was very little infant neuroscience data relevant to
this proposal. Although some speculations about the neu-
roscience of infant actionprocessinghavebeenoffered (Del
Giudice et al., 2009;Gallese et al., 2009;Heyes, 2010; Kilner
and Blakemore, 2007; Lepage and Théoret, 2007), over the
past fewyears a number of newempirical studies of infants
using neuroscience techniques have appeared.Here we focus on the newly emerging literature from
developmental cognitive neuroscience that has used EEG
measures to characterize overlaps in patterns of neural
activity between action perception and action production
in infants and young children. The approach taken in this
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eview involves ﬁrstly grounding the developmental neu-
oscience work by considering related studies done with
dults, and secondly analyzing the extant EEG studies that
ave assessed themu rhythmas an index of action process-
ng in infants and young children. This review and analysis
rovides the groundwork for a section of the essay that
rticulatesﬁveopen theoretical questionswhichwill hope-
ully serve to guide future work in this relatively new but
rowing area of developmental cognitive neuroscience.
. The EEG mu rhythm as an index of
erception–production overlaps in adults
Partof the reason for thedearthofdata inhuman infancy
oncerning the neural correlates of imitation and action
epresentation stems fromthe fact that themost frequently
sed methods for studying these in adults (fMRI and TMS)
re not feasible with infants. A breakthrough came when
esearchers began to apply measures derived from the
EG. EEG methods have been used extensively to investi-
ate infant cognitive and emotional development (Bell and
olfe, 2007; de Haan, 2007; Johnson, 2010a; Nelson and
uciana, 2008). The newly emerging infant neuroscience
orkonactionprocessinghas capitalizedbothon thiswork
nd also onwell-established EEGparadigms that have been
sed to study action representation in adults. Our focus is
n the mu rhythm, which has been the primary measure
f interest in the developmental and adult EEG studies of
ction representation. For infant work on action process-
ng using EEG measures other than the mu rhythm, see e.g.,
eid et al. (2009).
The adult EEG mu rhythm occurs in the alpha frequency
ange (8–13Hz) and is typically recorded from central
lectrode sites (e.g., C3, Cz and C4 in the international
0–20 system of EEG electrode placement). It has long
een known that the mu rhythm in adults is reduced in
mplitude by movement (Gastaut et al., 1954), with more
ecent work clarifying the speciﬁc dynamics of mu rhythm
ctivity prior to, during, and after voluntary movement
Pfurtscheller, 2003). The reduction in mu amplitude at
entral sites associated with movement onset is thought
o be due to a desynchronization – a decrease in neu-
onal synchrony – associated with the cortical processing
f movement-related information (Pfurtscheller and Lopes
a Silva, 1999).
The adult mu rhythm over central sites in adults is con-
idered to be separate from the classical posterior alpha
hythmwhichoccurs in the same frequencyband (8–13Hz)
ut which tends to be strongest at occipital electrode sites
nd is strongly synchronized (increased in amplitude) by a
eduction in ambient illumination or through eye closing.
iedermeyer (1997) summarized the contemporary view
hat the occipital alpha rhythm and the central mu rhythm
re functionally and topographically distinct oscillations
ithin the same “alpha-range” frequency band in adults.
nlike the occipital alpha rhythm, the mu rhythm at cen-
ral regions in adults is attenuated by voluntary movement
nd somatosensory stimulation and is minimally affected
y light/dark changes or eye closing (Kuhlman, 1978).
The established ﬁnding from adults of mu rhythm
esynchronization during overtmovement is, in itself, onlynitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123
one piece of the puzzle. Extending the initial observa-
tions by Gastaut and Bert (1954), recent ﬁndings from
the adult EEG literature have shown that the mu rhythm
at central sites is also desynchronized during the obser-
vation of others’ actions (Babiloni et al., 2002; Bernier
et al., 2007; Calmels et al., 2006; Cochin et al., 1999;
Fan et al., 2010; Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson, 2004;
Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004; Oberman et al., 2007;
Perry and Bentin, 2009; Pineda et al., 2000; Streltsova et
al., 2010). This recent work also builds on earlier research
using MEG which demonstrated the activation of motor
cortex – without concurrent muscle contractions – during
theobservationof anotherperson’s action (Hari et al., 1998;
see also Hari, 2006). This ﬁnding sparked further investiga-
tion of the mu EEG rhythm and other related oscillations,
such as the higher frequency beta rhythm. Pineda (2005,
2008) has summarized the recent literature on the adult
EEG mu rhythm, including a discussion of its physiological
origins as well as the role that it might play in the study of
social interactions and action processing.
The ﬁndings concerning the relation of the adult mu
rhythm to action processing, combined with the relative
ease of collecting EEG data from infants, leads to the ques-
tion of whether a mu-like rhythm is present in infancy.
Emerging evidence suggests that a rhythm indeed exists
in the infant EEG signal which has similar properties to the
mu rhythm in adults. Although there are a number of key
questions that need to be addressed (see Section 6), explor-
ing the properties of this infant EEG rhythm may provide a
usefulwindow into the linkages betweenactionperception
and production in early human development.
3. The infant central rhythm as an analog to the
adult mu rhythm
One starting point in the search for an infant analog of
the adultmu rhythmhas been to examine thedevelopment
of the EEG signal across infancy, with a particular focus
on unique rhythmic activity around central electrode sites,
from where the adult mu rhythm is typically recorded.
A second, related consideration has been to examine the
functional properties of such rhythmic activity and com-
pare them with the properties of the mu rhythm in adults.
We consider both strands of research.
3.1. Alpha-range rhythmic EEG activity in infancy
There is a rich history of examining the development of
the EEG signal in infants and its relation to psychological
development (Bell, 1998; Johnson, 2010a,b; Schmidt and
Fox, 1998). Thisworkhasestablished theexistenceof infant
rhythms that are functionally and topographically similar
to the classical EEG rhythms in adults, such as the posterior
alpha rhythm.
Early studies employed visual examination of the EEG
trace to suggest that an occipital alpha-like rhythm is
present in infants at a lower frequency range than in
adults (Henry, 1944; Lindsley, 1938; Smith, 1941). More
recent work using updated analysis techniques has solid-
iﬁed these observations: as in adults, the posterior infant
rhythm varies as predicted with manipulations in ambient
ntal CogP.J. Marshall, A.N. Meltzoff / Developme
lighting, but it occurs in the frequency range of 6–9Hz in
theﬁrst twoyearsof life (Stroganovaet al., 1999), compared
with the 8–13Hz range that characterizes this rhythm in
adults.
In addition to an alpha-like oscillation over occipital
sites which is prominent during conditions of reduced illu-
mination, studies of the developing EEG have documented
a rhythm over central sites which occurs in the same fre-
quency range in infancy (around6–9Hz)butwhichappears
to have different functional properties. In his classic work,
Smith (1938, 1941) employed visual examination meth-
ods to document a distinct oscillation at a frequency of
7Hz over central sites which could be seen in the waking
EEG signal at 4 months of age. The mean frequency of this
rhythm, which Smith labeled “central alpha,” remained at
7Hz until around 18 months of age, when it was present at
a slightly higher frequency (8Hz). Hagne et al. (1973) also
noted a central rhythm in the EEGwhichwas clearly visible
in power spectra at a peak frequency of 6Hz at 6 months
of age.
More recent ﬁndings have further illuminated devel-
opmental changes in the infant central rhythm. One
systematic investigation was carried out by Marshall et al.
(2002) who examined the development of the EEG signal
from infancy to early childhood in a longitudinal sam-
ple during periods of quiet attention to an abstract visual
stimulus. During periods of quiet visual attention at the
age points of 10, 14 and 24 months, a prominent central
rhythm was clearly present in the EEG power spectra with
a peak frequency of 7–8Hz. By 51 months of age, the peak
frequency of the central rhythm had shifted to 9Hz. It is
notable that at all ages a similar peak in the power spectra
was not clearly discernible over the other scalp regions that
were examined in this study (frontal, parietal, and occipi-
tal).
Further work has clariﬁed the functional properties of
the central EEG rhythm in infancy. As in adults, one way
in which this has been done is by contrasting changes
in activity at central and occipital sites in response to
qualitative changes invisual stimulation. In theearlyobser-
vations of Smith (1941), the amplitude of the infant central
rhythm was not reduced by eye-opening, but the occipital
rhythm was strongly affected. More recently, the exper-
imental work of Stroganova et al. (1999) conﬁrmed that
in contrast to the occipital rhythm, the amplitude of the
central rhythm in 7- to 12-month-olds was not increased
during a condition of darkness (see also Galkina and
Boravova, 1996). On the basis of this evidence, Stroganova
et al. (1999) suggested that the infant central rhythm in
the 6–9Hz range is analogous to the adult mu rhythm
(see also Stroganova and Orekhova, 2007). The develop-
ing trajectory of the peak of the early central rhythm
suggests that, as with the posterior alpha rhythm, the fre-
quency range of the infant mu band gradually increases
over childhood until it reaches the adult frequency band
(8–13Hz).Although the foregoing work suggests that the infant
central rhythm is functionally distinct from the occipital
alpha rhythm, and that it is likely related to the adult mu
rhythm, it did not consider whether the infant mu rhythm
was reactive to action execution and action observation.nitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123 113
3.2. Logical considerations in using the infant mu rhythm
in the study of action processing
For studies exploring the relation of the putative mu
rhythm in infants to action processing, we suggest two
logical considerations. First, it is crucial to test for similar-
ities in the infant EEG response to both action observation
and action execution. In order to forge clearer connections
between the reactivity of the adult mu rhythm and the
infant central rhythm, one needs to assess whether the
infant rhythm isdesynchronized (relative to abaseline con-
dition) for both the perception and production of action.
Testing one of these conditions alone is insufﬁcient. Sec-
ond, it is important to explore the scalp topography of infant
EEG responses to action observation and execution. Infor-
mation on the regional patterning of effects would help
tie infant work to the adult mu rhythm ﬁndings, in which
an overlap in response to action execution and observa-
tion has been reported to be speciﬁc to the central region
(Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson, 2004).
Reviewed next are the studies that have speciﬁcally
attempted to examine the infant mu rhythm in relation
to action processing. We begin with studies that reported
EEG ﬁndings only from one condition–action observation.
We distinguish these from studies in which both action
observation and action execution conditions have been
employed. For each study, we also consider whether the
scalp topography of infants’ EEG responses was examined
in an attempt to look for regional speciﬁcity of effects.
4. Infant EEG responses to action observation
In an initial study of infant EEG responses to human
actions, Nyström (2008) showed 6-month-old infants and
adults videos of a person carrying out goal-directed actions
(reaching for and grasping an object). The adults showed
greater mu rhythm desynchronization to observing these
stimuli compared with observing an inanimate stimulus (a
moving dot), but there was no clear evidence of a simi-
lar differential response in the infant EEG signal. Based on
the foregoing review of the development of EEG responses
in infancy, one issue here is that there may be large indi-
vidual differences in the presence and salience of the mu
rhythm in the infant EEG at 6 months of age. It is also possi-
ble that the use of video versus live stimuli inﬂuenced the
results; other studies using neuroscience measures have
showndifferences in infant responses to2Dversus3Dstim-
uli in young infants (Carver et al., 2006; ShimadaandHiraki,
2006).
In more recent work, Nyström et al. (2010) reported on
EEG responses in 8-month-olds during the observation of a
live experimenter performing a grasping action. Compared
with the observation of a hand movement that was not
directed toward a particular goal, there was a signiﬁcant
desynchronization in the 5–9Hz frequency band which
occurred around the time that the object was grasped. This
effect was quite subtle, however, lasting approximately
100ms, and unlike other recent ﬁndings (reported below)
it was only apparent after independent component analy-
sis (ICA) had been applied to the EEG data. In terms of scalp
topography, thedifferencebetween the twoconditionswas
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pparent at variouselectrodes across the scalpbutwas con-
entratedaround themid-central electrode (C4) in the right
emisphere.
van Elk et al. (2008) took a different approach. Rather
han using goal-directed hand actions, as in much of the
rior work on the mu rhythm in adults, these authors
howed 14-to-16-month-olds videos of infants who were
rawling or walking. Spectral power in the 7–9Hz band
as more attenuated during the observation of crawl-
ng than walking. The authors suggested that this may be
elated to infants at this agehaving greater experiencewith
rawling. Follow-up correlational analyses suggested that
nfants with greater crawling experience showed greater
EG desynchronization to the crawling versus the walk-
ng videos. The difference between the crawling versus
alking conditions was not signiﬁcant at left or right mid-
entral sites (C3 and C4), which are the typical electrode
ites for detecting mu, and was only signiﬁcant at frontal
nd central midline sites (FCz and Cz). This aspect of the
ndings isdifﬁcult to interpret, although it ispossible that it
elates to a suggestion in the adult literature (Pfurtscheller
t al., 1997) thatmu rhythmactivity at C3 and C4 is primar-
ly responsive tohandactions, rather thanactions involving
ther parts of the body.
Stapel et al. (2010) computed alpha-range power while
2-month-olds watched sequences showing an adult car-
ying out two different kinds of actions. In one sequence
ype, the observed actions were ordinary (e.g., lifting a cup
o themouth), and in the other sequence type, the observed
ctions were unusual (e.g., lifting a mobile phone to the
outh, instead of placing it on the ear). Power in a nar-
ow frequency band (7.5–8.3Hz) was signiﬁcantly lower
t fronto-central and mid-frontal sites during the obser-
ation of unusual actions compared with ordinary actions.
he authors interpreted this as showing a greater desyn-
hronizationof themurhythmin response toactionswhich
ave end-points that differ from what might normally be
xpected to happen. This inference raises a number of
uestions. First, it is not clear whether the frontal distri-
ution of the observed effect reﬂects differences in mu
hythm activity, since an action execution condition was
ot included which could have clariﬁed the characteris-
ics of the mu response. Second, the notion that observing
ore unusual actions would be associated with greater
esynchronization of the mu rhythm is not altogether con-
istent with the suggestion that the infant mu rhythm is
ore desynchronized when infants observe actions with
hich they have more extensive experience (van Elk et al.,
008).
The studies of Nyström (2008), Nyström et al. (2010),
an Elk et al. (2008), and Stapel et al. (2010) provide useful
nsights into the reactivity of the infant EEG to actionobser-
ation. However, returning to our logical considerations, it
houldbenoted that although these studies included a con-
ideration of scalp topography during action observation,
heydidnot includeanactionexecutioncondition.Without
uch a condition, it is difﬁcult to ﬁrmly link the ﬁndings to
rguments about developmental aspects of a neural over-
ap between action observation and action execution. We
ext consider the developmental EEG studies which tested
oth action observation and action execution conditions.nitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123
5. Infant EEG responses to both action observation
and execution
5.1. Early childhood studies
Prior to the appearance of studies in infants, a small
number of studies using older children examined mu
rhythm suppression during both action observation and
action execution conditions. In one of the ﬁrst, Fecteau
et al. (2004) used a subdural electrode grid to record EEG
froma36-month-old childwith epilepsywhowas awaiting
neurosurgery. They examined two conditions; while the
child drew with her right hand and while she watched an
adult carry out a similar drawing action. The main ﬁnd-
ing was that alpha-range power at two electrodes over
somatosensory cortex showedsigniﬁcantdecreases inboth
conditions, relative to a resting baseline in which the child
sat quietly with her eyes open.
This preliminary work was followed by a larger study of
older children (mean age 8 years) by Lepage and Théoret
(2006) who recorded scalp EEG during observation of
repetitive hand actions which were either goal-directed
(a grasp) or not (moving a ﬂat hand). Observation of the
grasping action was associated with greater mu rhythm
desynchronization at central sites compared with observa-
tion of the ﬂat hand movements. This study also included
an action execution condition, with children’s execution
of hand grasps of an object being associated with a signiﬁ-
cantdesynchronizationof themurhythmover central sites,
compared with the baseline epoch as well as compared
with the two observation conditions (observing a grasp or
observing a ﬂat hand). Two points are noteworthy. First,
themagnitude ofmudesynchronization during action exe-
cution was much greater than during action observation.
Second, analyses were only reported for central electrode
sites and thus did not allow for a consideration of the scalp
topography of the EEG response.
5.2. Infant studies
Southgate et al. (2009) reported signiﬁcant desynchro-
nization of what they called “sensorimotor alpha” (i.e.,
the mu rhythm) in the EEG of 9-month-old infants while
they reached toward and grasped objects (small toys)
that were presented through closed curtains. The desyn-
chronization in the EEG response was present over a
cluster of central–parietal sites during action execution,
and reﬂected a reduction in amplitude during action exe-
cution relative to a 200ms baseline epoch, which began
1000ms prior to the onset of the infant’s reaching action.
The use of this temporally separate baseline was presum-
ably meant to minimize the potential contamination of the
baseline by EEG activity related to motor preparation.
For the analysis of infants’ EEG responses to action
observation, the speciﬁc frequency between 6 and 13Hz
which showed the maximum desynchronization during
infant motor production (reaching) was identiﬁed for each
infant. Individualized frequency bands were computed
which extended 1Hz above and below this peak frequency.
These individual-speciﬁc bands were then used during the
analysis of EEG from epochs in which infants observed
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actions being carried out. The use of individualized fre-
quency bands helps compensate for potential individual
differences in the frequencyof themurhythm,although the
actual variability between infants may be relatively lim-
ited. Although Southgate et al. (2009) did not report the
frequency distribution of their mu bands, a second study
using similar methods (Southgate et al., 2010) reported
that the frequency band was either 6–8Hz or 7–9Hz for
the majority (17/22) of infants, with the bands for the
remaining participants being at slightly higher frequency
ranges.
Southgate et al. (2009) analyzed changes in EEG
responses during infants’ observation of actions carried out
by a hand which reached for and grasped an object lying on
the stage ﬂoor. Therewere curtains around the stagewhich
initially opened to reveal the object (prior to the hand’s
appearance) and then closed after the object had been
grasped by the hand. Relative to a preceding baseline, there
was a small but signiﬁcant desynchronization during the
action observation condition. Further analyses suggested
that this decease began when the curtains were opening,
prior to the onset of observed movement of the hand. This
ﬁnding might complicate the interpretation of the results
(since the response occurs before infants observed the rele-
vant motor act), but Southgate et al. (2009) suggest that it
reﬂected infants’ learning to predict the impending action
based on the curtain movement. This interpretation was
supported by supplementary analyses suggesting that the
desynchronization to the curtain opening was not present
in the ﬁrst three trials of the observation protocol, but
appeared after that point.
Southgate et al. (2010) used similar methods in a sec-
ond study of 9-month-olds that manipulated the stimulus
in a ﬁne-tuned way. They reported that compared with the
movement of a ﬂat, turned-up hand, EEG desynchroniza-
tion was greater during observation of a reaching hand in
a grasping posture, even when the outcome of the hand
action was not seen. Consistent with the interpretation of
their prior study, and in linewith Csibra (2007), this ﬁnding
was seen as reﬂecting infants’ prediction of the motor pro-
gram thatwould be needed to achieve the goal or end-state
of the action (i.e., grasping). In order to control for famil-
iarity effects, two other conditionswere also contrasted for
which the occluder was not present and in which the hand
Fig. 1. Photos demonstrating the execution (left) and observation (right) conditi
ranging from ±500ms of the button push by the infant or adult. During observatinitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123 115
(either as a ﬂat hand or a mimed grasp) moved toward the
stage and came to rest on it. No signiﬁcant difference in
EEG desynchronization was observed between these con-
ditions.
Returning to the two logical considerations speciﬁed
earlier, the ﬁrst concerned the need to include both action
observation and execution conditions. By including both
conditions, the studies of Southgate et al. (2009, 2010)
advance our understanding beyond the prior work with
infants. The second logical consideration concerned the
need for analyzing the scalp distribution of EEG responses.
In this respect it is notable that their statistical results in
these studies were reported only for one cluster of elec-
trodes straddling central and parietal scalp regions and
thusdetailed scalp topography information is not available.
Marshall et al. (2010) attempted to satisfy both logical
considerations simultaneously by examining infants’ EEG
responses across a rangeof scalp regionsduringboth action
execution and action observation conditions. In formulat-
ing a suitable task we capitalized on paradigms and stimuli
that haveprovenuseful in assessing infant action imitation.
The action was a punctate goal-directed act, speciﬁcally a
buttonpressona custom-madebuttonboxwhich triggered
a short electronic melody (see Fig. 1). Previous work had
shown that 14-month-olds would quietly watch such an
act and also imitate it themselves (Meltzoff, 1988), thus
demonstrating an observation–execution network at the
behavioral level. The experimental question was whether
infant mu rhythm desynchronization could be detected
during the observation as well as the execution of this
action.
WeexaminedEEGreactivity tobothperceptionandpro-
duction, relative to baseline epochs preceding each trial in
which infants viewed simple visual patterns. The reactivity
of the EEG rhythm in the 6–9Hz range over central elec-
trode sites (Marshall et al., 2002)was the focus of the study,
although in linewith our emphasis on elucidating the scalp
topography of the infant EEG response, we also analyzed
activity in the samebandover frontal, parietal, andoccipital
scalp regions. The analyses were time-locked to the culmi-
nation of the goal-directed action, with the analysis epoch
extending 500ms before and after the button press.
As predicted from the adult work, there was a signiﬁ-
cant desynchronization over the central region (electrodes
ons in Marshall et al. (2010). EEG analyses were conducted on the epoch
on infants did not have an object; they simply watched.
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3/Cz/C4) during epochs in which infants executed the
utton press act. There was also a signiﬁcant desynchro-
ization at central sites when infants observed an adult
erform the same act. We extended our analyses to a
ange of other scalp regions and found that although the
eduction in 6–9Hz band power during action observa-
ion extended beyond central sites (to frontal and parietal
egions), the signiﬁcant desynchronization during action
xecution was speciﬁc to central sites. This ﬁnding that the
entral region was the only region in which there was a
ommon desynchronization of 6–9Hz band power during
oth action execution and observation is congruent with
ork on the adult mu rhythm, in which similar regional
peciﬁcity has been reported (Muthukumaraswamy and
ohnson, 2004). Our ﬁndings using a goal-directed task
button-press action) further suggest that mu rhythm
esynchronization in infants, as in adults, occurs to inten-
ional actions that extend beyond the biologically relevant
ct of grasping.
. Five open theoretical questions about the infant
u rhythm response
We have summarized ﬁndings suggesting that the
–9Hz EEG rhythm at central sites reﬂects the infant mu
hythm, and is a candidate measure for studying the neu-
al processes involved in infants’ action processing. Here
e suggest ﬁve open questions that are relevant to con-
tructing a more comprehensive theoretical base about
he measurement and meaning of mu rhythm desyn-
hronization in infancy, and its potential connection to
nfant imitation and other aspects of infant social cogni-
ion.
.1. Are there developmental changes in the mu rhythm
esponse?
In compiling the infant EEG studies to date, one can
iscern signs of a developmental change in the magni-
ude of mu desynchronization. Consider ﬁrst the data from
ction execution. In the study of older children (mean age
f 8 years), Lepage and Théoret (2006) reported that the
ean extent of desynchronization of mu power at cen-
ral sites during execution of a hand grasp relative to a
aseline epoch was around 60%, which is similar to that
eported for adults (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004).
arshall et al.’s (2010) work with 14-month-old infants,
ound a much smaller decrease in power (around 12%)
uring action execution, relative to a baseline in which
he infants looked at an abstract visual pattern. In the
outhgate et al. (2009) study with 9-month-old infants,
he extent of desynchronization during reaching compared
ith a baseline epoch just prior to reaching also appears to
e small relative to theworkwith older children and adults
around 10%).
Intriguingly, there are similar differences for the obser-
ation of others’ actions. Lepage and Théoret’s (2006) work
ith older children showed a desynchronization of around
5% during action observation relative to baseline, which is
gain consistent with adult work (Muthukumaraswamy et
l., 2004). Marshall et al. (2010) found a smaller decreasenitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123
(around 14%) in band power at central sites when 14-
month-olds observed the adult’s action. In the Southgate
et al. (2009) study of 9-month-olds, the extent of desyn-
chronization during action observation appears to be even
smaller (around 5%).
If these changes in the magnitude of the mu response
indicate a genuine developmental increase in activity of
a neural system subserving action perception–production
maps, it would be of considerable theoretical interest.
We note, however, that at present there are differences
between the studies that make a deﬁnitive interpretation
difﬁcult. For example, the Marshall et al. (2010) proce-
dure involved a socially interactive, reciprocal imitation
protocol with a live experimenter, rather than the blocked
presentationof executionandobservationconditions (with
no give-and-take turn-taking) that was used by Southgate
et al. (2009). It is possible that the socially interactive
nature of our protocol induced greater EEG desynchroniza-
tion during action observation.
A direct comparison of the extant studies is further
complicatedbydifferences in othermethodological details,
such as the speciﬁc frequency band used, the algorithms
employed to computemuamplitude, the scalp regions ana-
lyzed, and the temporal epochs examined. More generally,
the variations in these details present a signiﬁcant issue
for constructing a comprehensive picture of the nature and
properties of the infant mu rhythm response. Another rel-
evant factor is that there appears to be a great deal of
individual variability in the infantmu response,whichmay
partly be a function of the relatively low numbers of trials
that are inherent in infant EEG work relative to work with
older children and adults.
Two theoretical issues also merit attention. The ﬁrst
concerns the possible emergence of the infant mu rhythm
at ages younger than those tested so far. Some of the
descriptive work on the infant mu rhythm has suggested
that aprominentmupeak is present in theEEGpower spec-
trum in the secondhalf of theﬁrst year of life, but not before
(Hagne et al., 1973;Marshall et al., 2002).However, the lack
of a visual peak in the power spectrum noted in this work
does not preclude the possibility that a low-amplitude mu
rhythm is present in the ﬁrst six months of life. In this
respect, the requisite studies of EEG responses to action
execution and action observation have not yet been car-
ried out with younger infants. Careful studies in the ﬁrst
6 months of life are needed which comport to the logical
requirements outlined earlier (Section 3.2).
Another related issue concerns hemispheric asymme-
tries in the mu rhythm response to action observation and
action execution. The adult literature on the mu rhythm
shows inconsistencies (see e.g., Muthukumaraswamy et
al., 2004; Perry and Bentin, 2009; Streltsova et al., 2010),
and ﬁndings from infants are also not clear. For instance,
Southgate et al. (2009) reported lateralization of the
infant mu response for observation but not execution, but
Marshall et al. (2010) found bilateral activation for both
conditions. One possible pointer for future investigation
comes from work in adults which suggests that lateral-
ization of the mu response may change from early to late
stages of action processing (Crone et al., 1998), a possibility
which could be further examined in infancy.
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6.2. What are the main caveats and technical constraints
for clarifying the nature of the neural overlap between
action observation and execution in infancy?
As documented above, recent studies from our own
laboratories and others have identiﬁed a common desyn-
chronization of the infantmu rhythm to action observation
and execution. However, ﬁndings of regional overlaps
between patterns of neural activation via EEG are not,
by themselves, sufﬁcient to infer activation of the same
underlyingneural systems.Hereweraise three interrelated
issues which span both adult and infant studies using EEG
measures.
The ﬁrst concerns the functional speciﬁcity of changes
in alpha-range power over central sites. Given that EEG
desynchronization in the alpha frequency range can be
inducedacrossmultiple scalp regionsby theengagementof
general attentional or effortful processes (Klimesch, 1999),
it is important to establish that changes at central sites
reﬂect changes in the mu rhythm rather than being part
of a generalized suppression of alpha-range power across
the scalp. This issue is not restricted to infancy studies and
indeed runs through some recent work on the mu rhythm
in adults (e.g., Perry et al., 2010). One related possibility is
that volume conduction from other regions contributes to
apparent changes in mu power at central sites, which can
also make it difﬁcult to establish the functional speciﬁcity
of such changes. Such considerations make it particularly
important for studies to present analyses from a range of
scalp regions. The use of Laplacian reference conﬁgurations
which account for the activity of surrounding electrodes
may also be of assistance here, and although these have
been used in a few studies of the adult mu rhythm (e.g.,
Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson, 2004), they have not
been utilized in developmental research.
The second issue relates to other difﬁculties in inter-
preting changes in mu power at central electrode sites.
Work in adults has suggested that changes in oscillatory
EEG activity reﬂect the recruitment of complex combina-
tions of global and local processing networks, which can
even be intermixed within the alpha frequency band over
the same scalp region (Andrew and Pfurtscheller, 1997).
Moreover, in adults, the mu frequency range can be sub-
divided into upper and lower bands, which have different
functional properties (Pfurtscheller, 2003). To this point,
developmental studies have not examined these potential
complexities.
The third issue comes from suggestions in the adult cog-
nitive neuroscience literature that newer, more complex
test paradigms (e.g., crossmodal adaptation or repetition
suppression protocols) may provide more stringent tests
of shared activation than the procedures used to date (e.g.,
Dinstein, 2008). The logic behind this suggestion is that
activation of brain areas with putative mirroring proper-
ties should show adaptation across repeated presentations
of the same action, regardless ofwhether that action is exe-
cuted or observed. Adult neuroimaging work using fMRI
has begun to use such approaches (Chong et al., 2008;
Dinstein et al., 2007; Kilner et al., 2009), although there
is some debate about the merits of this method as a test
of mirroring activity. No relevant EEG work on crossmodalnitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123 117
adaptationof themurhythmresponsehasbeencarriedout,
either in adults or developmentally.
To this point, developmental examinations of the mu
rhythm have not engaged with the three foregoing issues;
futurework should rectify this, a processwhich couldbegin
by better integrating developmental ﬁndings with the cog-
nitive neuroscience literature on the mu rhythm in adults.
What may also assist is a deeper engagement by develop-
mental scientists studying mu with the neurophysiological
literature on the properties of sensorimotor EEG rhythms
from the perspective of motor control (e.g., MacKay, 2004).
There are also technical advances that are likely to fur-
ther our understanding of the infant mu rhythm response.
NewMEG technologies adapted for usewith infants (Imada
et al., 2006;Kuhl, 2010)promise toprovidemuchmore spe-
ciﬁc information about the functional properties and the
neural generators of the infant mu rhythm, as has been the
case for the adult mu rhythm (Hari and Salmelin, 1997).
Near-infrared spectroscopy is also emerging as a candidate
technique in infancy (Gervain et al., 2010), but has not been
much used to study action processing beyond an initial,
exploratory study by Shimada and Hiraki (2006).
Finally, we note a caveat and challenge faced by
developmental researchers who are investigating the
mu rhythm. The propensity for infants to move dur-
ing experimental protocols raises particular issues for all
neuroscience techniques, including EEG studies of the
mu rhythm. Although studies with infants have gener-
ally excluded trials in which participants performed overt
movements, it will be helpful for future work to seek
improved methods to rule out subtle movements (such as
the use of tilt sensors, as in Stapel et al., 2010) or even
latent muscle contraction. In some studies of adults, but
not all, the latter issue has been addressed by measuring
electromyographic (EMG) activity during action observa-
tion (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004), but to date this
has not been done with infants.
6.3. Can we build bridges between the infant
neuroscience work and behavioral evidence showing the
ﬂexibility of human imitation?
A key question concerns whether the mu rhythm
response to action observation varies according to the spe-
ciﬁc bodily transformations used by the infant: Would the
mu rhythm be equally responsive to conditions in which
different movements are used to achieve the same goal?
This question relates to issues in the ongoing debate in
the adult cognitive neuroscience literature concerning a
putative adult human MNS. Two particular issues in this
debate concern the sensitivity of such a system to the goal
of an act versus the speciﬁc movements used to achieve
that goal (for disparate views see Csibra, 2007; Hamilton
et al., 2007; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), and more gen-
erally the role of top-down inﬂuences and modulation by
social, cognitive, and contextual factors, rather than direct
“motor resonance.”
This issue is particularly relevant to developmental sci-
entists, given the extensive literature on infant imitative
learning and the ultimate aim of connecting behavioral,
cognitive, and neuroscience perspectives on development.
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ehavioral studies show that a variety of speciﬁc factors
nﬂuence whether young children imitate the precise body
ransformation they observe (the “means” used or “how
omething is done”) versus the goal of the act. Behav-
oral studies also indicate that human children are ﬂexible
mitators and not slavish or rote copiers; rather than an
utomatic echoing of what is in the visual ﬁeld, there
ppears to be a good deal of top-down regulation of who,
hen, and what infants imitate.
Four exampleswill sufﬁce. First, imitation of the speciﬁc
odily transformations occurs in young infants (Meltzoff
nd Moore, 1997), but in slightly older children it is more
ikely when the goal of an act is unclear or difﬁcult for
he child to discern (e.g., Bekkering et al., 2000; Gattis et
l., 2002; Gleissner et al., 2000; Williamson and Markman,
006) or when children see actions performed by a socially
ngaging adult who seems to be showing them how to
erform a novel act (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff,
988).
Second, infants are not only sensitive to both the means
sed and the goal obtained, but they also can abstract
nd re-enact human goals when they are inferred and not
irectly seen or achieved. For example, in one study an
dult struggled to pull apart a dumbbell-shaped object
ut was unable to do so because his hands slipped off
he sides as if the object was stuck (Meltzoff, 1995). The
bject remained unchanged. Infants saw a pattern of three
ttempts to pull apart the object.When theywere given the
bject themselves infants adopted different means from
hat used by the adult; they wrapped their ﬁngers securely
round the ends and pulled it apart (something they had
ot seen). They did not imitate what the adult actually did,
ut what he “was intending to do” – the goal of the act, not
he literal behavior itself.
Third, children can imitate from memory after per-
orming intervening motor acts between observation and
xecution. This temporal ﬂexibility raises questions about
heoretical appeals to direct “resonance” mechanisms. In
ne study, investigators showed young children how to
pen a drawer using an innovative technique (Williamson
t al., 2008). Children at ﬁrst tried their own usual means,
ut when they failed (as assured by the experimental
etup), they used theirmemory of the adult’s act. Thus they
t ﬁrst rejected the adult’s act. After performing an inter-
ening act and failing, they imitated from memory. This
s related to the powerful phenomenon of deferred imita-
ion in infancy. In the “observation-only” test paradigm for
eferred imitation, infants are conﬁned to observing a goal-
irected act at Time 1 but are not given the object to touch
r handle. After a delay, they return to the laboratory and
re presented with the object to pick up for the ﬁrst time.
he results show that infants can imitate after a week’s
elay, performing the act from long-term memory, despite
hat fact that the adult is now sitting passively and there
s no action in the visual ﬁeld with which to “resonate”
Meltzoff, 1988).Fourth, infants can inhibit their imitative responding.
ne study showed that imitation of a goal-directed act
as modulated as a function of the emotional response
hat the act elicited in a third-party observer. Infants wit-
essed that when an adult experimenter performed thenitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123
act, an adult observer reacted with negative emotion. This
emotion was not directed towards the infant and was not
contingent on their actions; the infant was simply observ-
ing the adult-adult social interaction. The results showed
that infants self-regulated their subsequent imitation. They
were loathe to imitate the act as long as the observer was
visually monitoring the infant’s behavior (Repacholi et al.,
2008). Infants selectively chose when it was propitious to
imitate based on a conjunction of the emotional history
of the observer and whether that observer could visually
monitor the infant’s response.
All this behavioral research on child development
raises two clusters of questions for future neuroscience
studies–one concerning top-down inﬂuences and the other
concerning the aspects of the display (“means or goals”) to
which the mu rhythm responds. Future research in infants
and adults alike will need to isolate whether mu desyn-
chronization during action observation reﬂects the precise
bodily transform used, or whether it reﬂects an alterna-
tive set of movements that could accomplish the same
goal. One relevant proposal comes from Southgate et al.
(2010), who suggested that the infant mu rhythm response
during infants’ observation of ongoing actions reﬂects
“motor system activation” which has a predictive qual-
ity. This interpretation grows from Csibra’s (2007) ideas
about neural systems which predict the consequences of
other’s actions without necessarily mirroring the move-
ments of the actor (see also de Vignemont and Haggard,
2008; Jacob, 2008; Prinz, 2006). However, at this point
the EEG research has not allowed for an effective sep-
aration of means and goals between action observation
and action execution, leaving the extant mu rhythm ﬁnd-
ings open to multiple interpretations in both infants and
adults (see also Chaminade et al., 2002; Gazzola et al.,
2007; Jastorff et al., 2010 for discussion of similar issues
in adult fMRI and PET work). It is also possible that the
infant mu response may be too limited to address such
subtleties.
Regarding top-down inﬂuences, future studieswill need
to take into account that although some form of auto-
matic and direct resonance with a visual stimulus may
occur in human infants, it is not clear that this notion is
sufﬁcient, or maximally helpful, in our attempts to under-
stand the selective, ﬂexible, memory-based imitation that
composes the imitative prowess of the human young, and
their choices about what, when, and how to imitate (see
Meltzoff, 2007a,b for discussion). A deeper examination
of these issues is highly relevant for theories of action
representation, imitation, and how infants learn causal
means-end skills from observing experts in their culture.
6.4. What are the theoretical implications of the
somatosensory origins of the mu rhythm?
In the literature from adults and infants on EEG
responses to action observation, changes in mu rhythm
amplitude have often been characterized as indexing
“motor activation.” However, as noted by Southgate et al.
(2009), how the mu rhythm relates to the activity of the
motor system is not well understood. It is relevant that
historical accounts of the mu rhythm have long noted its
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relation with somatosensory activation (Chatrian et al.,
1959; Kuhlman, 1978). Links between the mu rhythm and
the somatosensory systemhave been further strengthened
by recent studies from adults which have used concurrent
EEG/fMRI recording or MEG localization methods to show
that the EEG mu rhythm reﬂects activity in (and likely orig-
inates in) primary somatosensory cortex (Formaggio et al.,
2008; Hari and Salmelin, 1997; Oishi et al., 2007; Ritter et
al., 2009; Yuan et al., 2010).
Future work should be directed towards exploring the
connections between the mu rhythm, motor system activ-
ity, and somatosensory processing. For example, there is
an increasingly large body of research showing that activ-
ity in primary somatosensory cortex – from where the mu
rhythm seems to originate – is heavily inﬂuenced by top-
down factors (Blakemore et al., 1998), suggesting complex,
bidirectional connections between the somatosensory sys-
temand a variety of other neurocognitive systems, not only
the motor system per se (Dijkerman and de Haan, 2007;
Longo et al., 2010).
Recent work on how mu desynchronization relates to
action processing has taken a particular approach to fram-
ing the somatosensory origins of the mu rhythm in the
context of its use as an index of motor system activation.
According to this view, changes in mu rhythm ampli-
tude index the downstream modulation of somatosensory
cortex by activity in areas ofmotor cortex, particularly pre-
motor areas (Pineda, 2005). In support of this assumption,
there is evidence from the adult literature showing the
modulation of the somatosensory system by motor system
activity during action planning and execution (Voss et al.,
2006, 2008).
We suggest that another role for the somatosensory sys-
tem has been overlooked or downplayed, and that it may
be important to understanding the utility of this rhythm
(see also Pineda, 2008). One impetus for our suggestion
comes from the neuroimaging work in adults by Gazzola
and Keysers (2009), who found consistent activation of pri-
mary somatosensory cortex across both action execution
and observation conditions. These authors argued that this
activation during action observation may reﬂect the sim-
ulation of the proprioceptive and tactile consequences of
observed actions (see also Keysers et al., 2010). Also in
the adult literature, activation of somatosensory cortex has
been noted during the observation of tactile stimulation
of another person (Blakemore et al., 2005; Keysers et al.,
2004).
Further examination of how the mu rhythm response
relates to the proprioceptive and tactile (somatosen-
sory) consequences of observed actions may prompt more
nuanced thinking in both the adult and infant literatures.
With regard to developmental work, it is notable that
one theory of infant imitation has emphasized the role of
somatosensation (particularly proprioception) in the inter-
modal mapping of the observed acts of others onto one’s
own bodily acts (Meltzoff andMoore, 1997). Although con-
necting these considerations to the infant mu rhythm is
speculative at this point, this possibilitymerits further con-
sideration and may eventually lead us to learn that the
infant mu response reﬂects more than motor system acti-
vation alone.nitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123 119
6.5. How do action experience and learning inﬂuence
action perception?
An enduring issue for theories of action representation
concerns the role of an observer’s prior self-experience.
Work with adults using a range of methodologies from
cognitive psychologyhas explored theways inwhich expe-
rience with speciﬁc actions inﬂuences the perception of
those actions when performed by others. A variety of
behavioral evidence has suggested that the perceptual
processes involved during the viewing of others’ actions
vary according to the observer’s experience with those
actions (e.g., Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). From a neu-
roscience perspective, adult fMRI work has shown that the
level of activation of premotor cortex during action obser-
vation is positively related to the observer’s expertise with
performing the action (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006;
Cross et al., 2006). However, there are some inconsisten-
cies in this literature when it comes to adult EEG work on
the mu rhythm. For instance, although some EEG ﬁndings
align with the foregoing fMRI results (Marshall et al., 2009;
Orgs et al., 2008), a recent ﬁnding from adults suggests
that increased expertise with actions is associated with
less desynchronization of alpha-range rhythms, including
the central mu rhythm, during observation of those actions
(Babiloni et al., 2010).
Turning to developmental questions, various proposals
(based on behavioral data) have emphasized the inﬂu-
ence of infants’ ﬁrst-person experience with behaviors on
their processing of those behaviors when they are subse-
quently observed (e.g., Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1982; Meltzoff
and Brooks, 2008; Sommerville et al., 2005; Woodward
et al., 2009). There is very little neuroscience research
on this issue, but some work is emerging. As noted ear-
lier, van Elk et al. (2008) reported that infants with more
crawling experience showed greater EEG desynchroniza-
tion to watching videos of crawling versus walking infants.
AlthoughNyströmet al. (2010) didnot test a variety of ages,
they speculated that the 8-month-olds in their study may
have shown mu rhythm desynchronization to a grasping
action because they had themselves mastered the pro-
duction of the same kind of action. Further infant studies
that combine EEG measures with individual differences in
action experience are clearly needed inorder tobetter eval-
uate such suggestions.
On the other side of the coin, emerging work in the
developmental neurosciences will need to consider that
infants can imitate novel actions (Meltzoff, 1988). Thus, a
neural system linking observation and execution cannot
be limited only to well-practiced habits for which speciﬁc
associative links have been built up. One key herewill be to
integrate a developmental neuroscience perspective with
existing cognitivemodels that haveposited thenotionof an
“act space” bywhich the generative capacity of human imi-
tation– forexample, the imitative learningofnewskills and
routines – could be realized (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997).7. Conclusions and future directions
We have reviewed research which suggests that a
rhythm in the infant EEG resembles the adult mu rhythm
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n terms of its topography and function. We have ana-
yzed what is currently known about the reactivity of this
hythm to action observation and execution in infants,
nd have outlined a number of open theoretical ques-
ions concerning the nature and function of the infant
u rhythm response. The literature in this area is still
ather small, although it is a topic which promises to be
ne of the more rapidly growing areas in developmen-
al social–cognitive neuroscience. If carefully conducted,
uture studies of infants involving EEG and related meth-
ds such asMEGhave the potential to signiﬁcantly advance
urunderstandingof the fundamental linksbetweenaction
erception and action production and their ontogenesis.
Looking ahead, issues relevant to learning and develop-
ent are crucial. In particular, a detailed examination is
eeded of how neural mirroring systems are engendered
nd transformed by two types of behavioral experience:
a) self-generated actions (watching oneself produce hand
ovements and other goal-directed acts) and (b) expe-
iencing contingent social interaction (seeing a caretaker
irror one’s own acts, e.g., in reciprocal imitation games,
eltzoff, 2007a). It is likely that both seeing oneself act, as
ell aswatching others’ responses, play interwoven devel-
pmental roles.
By combining neuroscientiﬁc and behavioral studies
ith a developmental perspective we will enhance our
nderstanding of the representation of action. Such work
ill also address a central question in developmental sci-
nce: What neural processes allow humans to accelerate
earning about the material and social world by watching
he actions of our conspeciﬁcs? Human beings learn not
nly through temporal contingencies which bind actions
nd their consequences (conditioning), we also learn by
roxy,watching the acts of others in order to formulate our
wn action plans via imitation. This fundamental learning
rocess depends on links between perception and produc-
ion, which connect self and other prior to language, and
ndeed support language learning (Meltzoff et al., 2009).
Further work is clearly needed to tie the nascent ﬁnd-
ngs in developmental cognitive neuroscience to the large
ehavioral literature on perception–action coordination
nd imitation in infancy. The typeof research that is needed
s not well characterized as a search for the “neural mech-
nisms explaining the behavior.” This kind of phrasing
uggests a unidirectional view of brain–behavior relations
for a nuanced discussion of the construct of mechanism
n neuroscience, see Craver, 2007). Instead, neuroscience
ata could be seen as reﬂecting a different level of anal-
sis with no more explanatory power than other levels
uch as behavioral or cognitive levels (Miller and Keller,
000) – although even that view does not capture the
ull dynamic complexity of the brain–body–environment
nterface (Marshall, 2009).
Moreover, the bidirectional inﬂuence of brain and
ehavior can be seen to inﬂuence both the development of
nfants and the development of theories. Regarding the for-
er, it is not only that neural development drives behavior,
ut that behavior itself provides experience and input that
rganizes and inﬂuences biological plasticity and change
e.g., Gottlieb, 2007; Greenough et al., 1987). Regarding
he latter, althoughneuroscience often enriches our under-nitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 110–123
standing of behavior, it could be argued that the behavioral
evidence is often in advance of, and heavily inﬂuences, the
neuroscience work (Hatﬁeld, 2000). For instance, before
related neuroscience work was available, the behavioral
data on infant imitation suggested the preverbal coupling
between action perception and production in the human
case (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997). Indeed, infant imita-
tion, visually guided reaching, and social turn-taking all
illustrateperception–production links, and suggest speciﬁc
hypotheses and constraints for the elucidation of the neu-
ral processes that support them. As this search for neural
processes continues, a theoretical stance which recognizes
the dynamic, bidirectional inﬂuences between brain and
behavior, as well as the crucial importance of learning and
development, will ultimately be more productive than less
integrative approaches.
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